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There are numerous perspectives on the relationship between emerging biotechnology innovations and the structure of agriculture. Some em-
phasize what can be done to influence that relationship. The perspective pre-
sented in this paper precedes any such prescriptions. It argues that the historic 
interplay of public policy and marketplace forces will continue pretty much 
unabated, extending most trends but adding to them new expectations.
The next few years will see a proliferation of new products that offer in-
creased productivity and environmental gains. These will foster a general con-
solidation of farms and ranches at a rate somewhat lower that in the past. Gov-
ernment will do little to intervene. As always, public policies will not encourage 
smaller-scale production agriculture. Nor will there be a return to produc-
tion control practices. But a new policy dimension will be added—-a reliance 
on biotechnology to reduce environmental hazards.
EXPECTATIONS FOR NEW PRODUCTS
In forecasting public policy trends, the most important things to examine are 
policymaker perceptions. Perceptions guide process decisions. Such views are 
created as public officials and their staffs both systematically search and more 
randomly scan their environments for policy-relevant information. No one 
has been looking for a great debate on this topic. Biotechnology discussion 
and analysis have been a part of those environments for nearly a decade, none-
theless, some quite specific expectations have been created.1
Three policymaker beliefs that are generally shared stand out about 
biotechnology’s future in agriculture. First, officials commonly understand 
that U.S. agriculture is soon to be changed, perhaps dramatically, by the ad-
vent of a plethora of new products. Some will be crop specific, others will in-
fluence production practices. Second, these products are expected to bring 
significant increases in the supply and availability of numerous commodities 
from such major ones as dairy to minor crops like strawberries. Along with 
greater supply, officials also have been led to expect improvements in affected 
commodities, ranging from better flavor and texture to improved food safety.
1 The primary sources for this analysis are policymaker interviews. See Browne (1995).
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Particularly interesting to many officials, especially from areas where growers 
and other residents share space, are products that produce positive environ-
mental impacts: less water use, reductions in fertilizers and other chemical in-
puts, and a switch from intensive use of highly erodible and other fragile lands 
to ones that better sustain production.
The third belief is that biotechnology will bring important new profits to 
the sector, both for entrepreneurial agribusinesses and innovative growers. 
The expectation is that U.S. leadership in agricultural biotechnology will bring 
international gains in marketing both technology and food products to the 
world. Part of that belief is premised on the notion that the international 
marketplace will be increasingly short of food (Brown 1994).
The reasons why these beliefs are shared are easy to understand. On the 
one hand, biotechnology products—both in medicine and agriculture—have 
weathered substantial tests in the regulatory process (Browne and Hamm 1988).2 
On the other, most of those who provided policy information combined ef-
fectively to discredit the science of biotechnology opponents, most notably 
Jeremy Rifkin. As a consequence, the shared beliefs of public officials are near 
what policymakers find as an appealing consensus—biotechnology means a 
better and largely irreversible future for U.S. agriculture.
ACCEPTABLE TRADE-OFFS
Two other expectations worry policymakers, but not much. First, they fear 
that consumers will avoid biotechnology products because individuals such as 
Rifkin will continue their opposition. Public officials, however, see that as a 
marketplace problem: let retailers work that dilemma through with their cus-
tomers. The decisions of some grocers to offer “bST-free” milk is thought of 
as a reassuring event, one that shows that public policy actions are unnecessary.
The second worry is that growers will continue to exit the sector as they 
encounter economic losses, exaggerated by the costs of new biotechnology 
and its practices. For most policymakers who at least nominally appreciate 
over 140 years of public policy efforts to keep farmers in business, that con-
cern is more important than the consumer problem. Public officials under-
stand that efforts will be made to limit biotechnology introduction, use and 
its gains. But, intuitively, they feel these will be unsuccessful.
Very few policymakers, therefore, are moved by this farm problem.
There are three reasons why they are not. First, farm losses have been under-
stood to be slowing. While nearly 30 percent of farms were lost in the 1950s, 
just over 25 percent in the 1960s and about 18 percent in the 1970s, only 12 
percent were lost in the 1980s (Browne 1993:4). Second, policymakers find it 
relatively easy to deal with the economics of the sector, but they know it is
2 An often overlooked point is the degree to which biotechnology’s medical value, and 
glamour, rubs off on its acceptance in agriculture. Its allure is hard for public officials 
to resist.
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hard to keep individual growers in business. Farm losses continued during 
the past four decades even when net farm incomes rose.
Third, public officials recognize that farm losses are most severe at the 
mid-sized farm level. Those producers, it seems, simply face structural dis-
advantages that are beyond the historic emphasis of farm income policy. Reg-
ulating biotechnology will not alter that fact. In contrast, large farms that are 
the most likely biotechnology adapters are suffering fewer losses. And small 
farms, which rely mostly on off-farm incomes, have generally stabilized in 
number. Biotechnology need not be adopted by these small-farm growers for 
them to continue in their businesses.
Added to the limited concern of policymakers for farm effects are the at-
titudes of growers. Farmers themselves have shown almost no willingness to 
limit their use of new technologies. On the contrary, even farm protest lead-
ers of the 1980s were willing technology adapters and advocates (Browne 1993). 
Family-farm activists, who were also active in the late 1980s, favored limita-
tions but found few supporters in farm ranks. Nor did environmental interest 
groups, that once seemed natural allies, support them. The consequences are 
that demands to limit technology lack credibility in all but the most isolated 
places. So growers, like consumers, are left to market forces and some added 
federal income transfers that help some of them afford innovation.
POLICY RESULTS
These conditions make it unlikely that public officials will move against bio-
technology innovations. Quite the reverse seems true. To facilitate economic 
gains from investing in product research, policy efforts to protect business’ 
intellectual property rights will intensify. On another front, regulations that 
emphasize zero-risk tolerance for product use will be subject to greater scrutiny. 
Already the thrust of federal regulation, in general, has moved away from the 
strict policies of the 1970s to an emphasis on considering costs to the regulated 
industries in the 1990s (Eisner 1993). At the very least, this means that major 
biotechnology manufacturers and users will be looked to for more policy in-
formation. This, of course, will only reinforce currently prevailing percep-
tions of public officials.
Thus left to the market, the agricultural sector will face an ever greater 
structural imbalance in the future. Both public reliance on the largest farms 
and government tolerance of the smaller ones will continue.
But it seems the market will not be the only facilitating mechanism for en-
couraging this structural imbalance. The major policy debates about agricul-
ture and its future are over issues of the environment and property use. These 
are among the most contentious, and certainly the most difficult to resolve, 
policy contests in the history of U.S. agriculture (Browne 1995). Because policy-
makers understandably want such conflicts to abate, solutions are being ac-
tively sought to reconcile grower and environmentalist differences.
Biotechnology, which looks so promising for making environmental gains 
while fostering production, has even more than normal appeal as a result. What 
seems likely to occur are policy initiatives which encourage biotechnology 
product use. “Green payments” may be one mechanism, but regulatory pen-
alties for relying on traditional practices appear more affordable in a budget 
conscious environment. Any such efforts to facilitate biotechnology use, un-
less accompanied by substantial assistance, will work to the advantage of the 
largest producers as those most likely to afford them. Regulations will be hard 
to bear for middle and small sized growers.
CONCLUSION
It seems evident that, given current policymakers’ perceptions and pending 
public policy problems, biotechnology will only add to the farm structure 
problem of continuing consolidation. But for many, this brief analysis carries 
another point as well. What also is evident is just how little serious policy de-
bate these trends seem likely to create. Political noise and analytical evidence 
rallied in protest against structural trends are not likely to be well-received.
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